How agents learn from each other's actions is a fundamental question in economics. While the standard assumption is that agents can only learn from the choice outcomes of others, we argue that agents can also infer information from others' choice processes, in particular, their response times (RTs). We conduct a laboratory information cascade experiment where we manipulate subjects' ability to observe others' RTs as they make publicly observable decisions. We find that RTs contain information that is not contained in choice outcomes alone. Subjects are able to infer others' private information from the RTs without any training. Our results suggest that in strategic environments where RTs are publicly available, the information structure may be richer than traditionally assumed.
Understanding how information spreads through groups is important in several areas of economics. In many situations, individual agents have limited private information about the state of the world, but can potentially infer additional information from the actions of other agents in the environment. For example, a stock analyst may conduct her own research but she may also "herd" on the ratings of other analysts who have already publicly given their analyses (Welch 2000) . A large literature on observational learning has studied this topic in great detail, providing sharp theoretical predictions about individual behavior and information aggregation. The standard theoretical result in this literature indicates that information aggregation quickly ceases and with positive probability, people will "herd" on the wrong state (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992) .
A standard assumption in this literature is that agents infer social information only from the choice outcomes of other agents. These discrete actions obscure the transmission of private information, and the coarseness of the action space is what leads to herding. However, in many settings, agents observe not only the discrete choice of another agent, but also the amount of time that elapses before a choice is made. For example, in labor markets a job applicant observes whether he is offered employment but also how long it took to receive the offer after the interview. The speed with which an offer is extended can potentially carry information about the strength of the employer's preference for the applicant; this extra information may in turn influence the applicant's decision about whether to accept the offer.
In the political realm, the amount of time it takes to endorse a political candidate can convey information to other politicians and voters. For example, if someone takes a long time to endorse a candidate, others are likely to interpret this long response time as a weaker display of support than if the endorsement had come at the beginning of the campaign (Cohen et al. 2009 ). Finally in both personal and professional relationships people observe (and often extensively analyze) the time it takes for another person to respond to email or phone calls 1 .
From a theoretical point of view, if response times (RTs) are informative about an agent's private beliefs, then this suggests that many strategic environments contain richer information structures than are typically modeled.
In this paper, we conduct a carefully controlled laboratory experiment to test whether the availability of RT information systematically impacts behavior in a strategic setting. In order for RTs to have an impact on behavior, two conditions must be satisfied. First, RTs must contain information about an agent's private belief. Second, subjects in the experiment must be able to infer this information from another agent's RT. Our experimental design allows us to test both of these conditions. Our hypothesis that RTs can reveal private information in a strategic setting is motivated by a recent surge in economic analysis of response times in individual decision-making environments (Krajbich, Oud, and Fehr 2014; Woodford 2014; Webb 2015; Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki 2015; Rubinstein 2016; Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman 2015; Agranov and Ortoleva 2015; Spiliopoulos and Ortmann 2016) . Much of this work has focused on preference-1 There are several other applied settings where response times have been shown to contain information about economic variables, though not necessarily in a strategic environment. For example, Paravisini and Schoar (2013) show that response times contain information about credit applications. They find that the length of time (typically between two and ten minutes) that a loan officer takes to evaluate a loan application is increasing in the requested loan amount. In a corporate finance setting, Giglio and Shue (2014) show that the passage of time contains information about the probability a merger will be completed. The "response time" begins when the merger is announced, and the probability the merger is completed decreases with time.
elicitation settings where agents choose between bundles of goods (Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel 2010; Busemeyer and Townsend 1993; Mormann et al. 2010; Philiastides and Ratcliff 2013; Rodriguez, Turner, and McClure 2014; Polanía et al. 2014; Wilcox 1993) , although RTs have also been used in game-theoretic settings (Eliaz and Rubinstein 2014; Schotter and Trevino 2014; Rubinstein 2016 ).
The standard 'static' approach to modeling such behavior uses logit or probit functions to relate underlying preferences to choice outcomes (Marschak 1960; McFadden 1973; Loomes 2005; Webb 2013 ). The dynamical equivalents to these functions are sequential sampling models (SSM), which have been primarily developed in mathematical psychology (Ratcliff and Smith 2004; Ratcliff and McKoon 2008) . These models produce logit choice functions but also relate the underlying preferences and choice probabilities to RT. One notable prediction of these models is that stronger preferences produce more deterministic behavior and shorter RTs. At indifference, agents choose randomly, but counter-intuitively take the most time to decide (Chabris et al. 2009; Dickhaut, Rustichini, and Smith 2009; Moffatt 2005; Mosteller and Nogee 1951; Woodford 2014; Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki 2015; Krajbich, Oud, and Fehr 2014) . Thus in simple choice settings, RTs can be used to infer strength of preference (Konovalov and Krajbich 2016) .
Our experimental setting is based on the classic design of Anderson and Holt (1997) . There is an uncertain binary state of the world, and each subject receives a private and conditionally independent signal. Subjects move sequentially and provide a prediction of the state of the world, which then becomes public information to all subjects (see Weizsäcker (2010) for a metaanalysis of this class of experiments). Therefore, before a subject makes his prediction, he has access to his private signal and all actions of the subjects that have moved before him -but not their private signals. If these binary actions are the only observables, the theoretical prediction is that information aggregation will quickly cease and herding will occur. If the action space were augmented, it would be possible to achieve more efficient outcomes (Lee 1993) . Instead of changing the action space, which would fundamentally change the structure of the game, we allow subjects to observe their predecessors' RTs.
If decisions are governed by SSMs in our social learning setting, we would expect that when a subject's private information conflicts with the actions of his predecessors, he would take more time to decide. Thus, a subject may discount a predecessor's choice if he observes that it was generated with a long RT.
Interestingly, a footnote in the original Anderson and Holt (1997) paper hints at the idea that choice process data can reveal private information: "In an admittedly uncontrolled demonstration experiment…students seemed to use visual and voice cues in an attempt to discern whether the person making a prediction was agonizing over a sample draw that seemed unlikely given the pattern of earlier public predictions" (pg 851). By experimentally varying the ability of subjects to observe the RTs of their predecessors, we are able to systematically test whether behavior is causally affected by choice process data in the form of RT information.
The two main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we find that RTs do carry information about a subject's private beliefs, as the joint distribution of RTs and actions is consistent with the predictions of SSMs.
Importantly, the RTs contain additional information about a subject's private information that is not contained in the choice outcome alone. We find that subjects are indifferent between choosing with their private signal when they have observed a net imbalance of two previous actions against their private signal. On these trials, subjects exhibit the longest RTs and as we move away from this indifference point, RTs decline monotonically, consistent with these decisions becoming easier. This result is noteworthy because for a substantial number of trials (45%), choice probabilities do not vary significantly as we move away from the indifference point. Moreover, when we focus on situations where all predecessors have chosen the same action (and thus the ordering of actions cannot convey any information), we find that subjects take roughly twice as long to decide with a conflicting private signal compared to non-conflicting signal.
Therefore, variation in RTs clearly conveys private information obscured in the choice data.
In our second main result, we show that subjects are able to extract information about predecessors' private signals from their RTs. Specifically, we find that on trials where a subject's private signal conflicts with his predecessor's move, the subject is more likely to choose with his own private signal if the predecessor exhibited a long RT. The intuition follows directly from the result described above, and more generally from the SSM framework. If a predecessor exhibited a long RT, it is likely because his private information conflicted with that of the group. Therefore, a subject will discount the predecessor's decision and attach a relatively lower weight to the predecessor's action.
It is also important to emphasize that subjects in our experiment were not given any instructions on whether RTs contain information. Therefore, the fact that subjects understand that RTs are informative and have an implicit understanding of the process that generates RTs (i.e., SSMs), suggests that RTs are likely to be an important variable in any setting where they are observable.
Many of our choice results are consistent with the past experimental literature on information cascades. In particular, we find systematic deviations from Bayesian Nash equilibrium whereby subjects continue to condition their behavior on a predecessor's move even during an information cascade (Anderson and Holt 1997; Kübler and Weizsäcker 2005; Goeree et al. 2007; Weizsäcker 2010; Kübler and Weizsäcker 2004) A related literature on naïve herding has argued that subjects take their predecessors' actions at face value and do not infer that such information may be redundant given the actions of earlier predecessors (Eyster and Rabin 2010; Eyster and Rabin 2014) . A recent experimental paper provides support for this theory, demonstrating that deviations from Bayesian Nash behavior in social learning settings is likely to stem from strategic naïvete rather than errors in Bayesian updating (Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsacker 2015) . Our paper examines a distinct question about whether non-choice data can reveal private information, and whether subjects condition on this non-choice data when making decisions in a strategic setting.
Our paper also relates to the growing interest of using RTs in economic analysis. Perhaps most relevant to our study is a recent theoretical model of a social learning environment in which agents reveal not only their choice, but also "neuro" information --which is broadly defined as any evidence produced during the decision process (Eliaz and Rubinstein 2014) . While not a specific test of this model, our paper can be seen as a broader test of whether subjects use RTs that are endogenously generated by other subjects in an economic setting.
I. Experimental Design
Our experimental design is inspired by the canonical information cascade experiment in Anderson and Holt (1997) . The main unit of analysis is defined as a "round," where a group of 8 subjects were arranged in random order and incentivized to predict the uncertain state of the world. The order of subjects is indexed by i=1,2,…,8. In each round, there were two possible states of the world, ∈ { , } and the prior probability of each state was 0.5. The subject's task was to determine which state of the world was more likely. To do so, on his turn subject i received a conditionally independent private signal ∈ { , } such that Pr = = ) = Pr = = ) = 2/3, and saw the actions of all previous subjects 1, 2, …, i-1. The subject then had 10 seconds to identify the correct state of the world. The subject was later paid $1 if his prediction was correct, and $0 otherwise.
At the beginning of each round the first subject saw his private signal and had 10 seconds to make a choice. At the end of the 10 seconds, that subject's choice was displayed to every member of the group. Subjects observed this information for as long as they liked and then clicked on a "Continue" button.
Once every subject pressed the "Continue" button, the second group member received his private signal, and in addition, the first subject's choice was displayed again. As before, the second subject had 10 seconds to decide between A and B, followed by a feedback screen to every group member. Each subsequent turn proceeded in this manner with subjects always receiving a table containing the previous choices from the current round. Once all 8 subjects made their choices, the true state was revealed and those who predicted correctly received $1 (and $0 otherwise).
All subjects played the game in two different conditions. In the "no-RT condition", the game was implemented exactly as described above. In the "RT condition", the game was identical to the "no-RT condition", except the feedback table additionally contained each previous subject's RT. Thus subjects in the RT treatment could also observe how long their predecessors took to decide. It is important to note that in both treatments, the decision stage always took exactly 10 seconds, independent of the subject's RT. This was done so that subjects could only observe RT information in the RT condition, while also equating the overall time spent in each condition.
72 undergraduates from The Ohio State University participated in the experiment. The experiment was conducted in four sessions, the first three with 16 subjects each and the last with 24 subjects. We randomized the order of each condition across sessions: in the first and third sessions subjects played 15 rounds of the no-RT condition followed by 15 rounds of the RT condition; this order was reversed in the second and fourth sessions. In each round subjects were randomly re-matched into groups of 8.
At the beginning of each session, subjects gave informed written consent and then went through paper instructions for the relevant condition, including a 
II. Theoretical Predictions

A. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
As a rational benchmark, we first describe the solution to the game using the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium concept. This analysis follows directly from Anderson and Holt (1997) . If the first player receives an a signal, then he will choose A, and if he receives a b signal, he will choose B. Thus, the first player's action reveals his private signal. If the second player's signal matches the first player's move, then the second player chooses with his signal. If instead the second player observes a signal that does not match his predecessor's move, then he infers that one a signal and one b signal have been drawn in total, and thus his posterior that the state of the world is A is 1/2. In this case, we assume that the 2 nd player chooses with his own signal (such a tie-breaking assumption can be motivated by a nontrivial probability that the first player makes an error).
If the third player observes both the first two players choosing the same action A, then he infers that both players received an a signal. In the case that the third player receives an a signal, then he also clearly chooses A. In the case that he observes a b signal, then he perceives a total of two a signals and one b signal.
Thus the third player chooses A, in spite of his private info. In other words, the third player chooses A regardless of his private signal. This sets off an information cascade, with players i=4, …, 8 adopting the same logic and selecting action A regardless of their own private signals.
Taken together, the prediction of the BNE theory is that as soon as one state of the world receives on net two decisions in its favor, all subjects should choose this state of the world, independent of their private signals. Importantly, this means that it is rational for all participants to cease their belief updating at this point.
B. A deviation from Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Net Public Information
While BNE theory makes sharp predictions in our setting, previous experiments using a similar design have documented systematic deviations from While we do not take a stand on the specific behavioral theory that generates deviations from BNE in the prior literature, it is still useful to describe the common prediction made by these alternative theories, namely that subjects continue to infer information from choices that are uninformative in the BNE framework. In particular, choices made during a cascade will continue to convey information and influence later subjects' beliefs and thus behavior.
To make this clear, we define a variable called the Net Public Information, which is defined for subject i as:
term takes on the value 1 if the subject receives an a private signal, and -1 if he receives a b private signal. The second term gives the difference in the observed "A" moves and observed "B" moves. Under BNE, once
cascade is triggered and the actions of subjects i+1, i+2, …, T, will not reveal their private information. In contrast, under several of the behavioral theories mentioned above, a subject's action will depend on the value of NPI, even when
To guide our analyses of deviations from BNE, we use a simple rule that maps NPI to actions, where a subject's belief that his signal matches the state of the world is strictly increasing in ! . Such a rule is consistent with, for example, an extreme version of the naïve herding model of Eyster and Rabin (2010) . It is important to emphasize that we use NPI as a simple way to demonstrate the link between RTs, private signals, and choices. The specific construction of NPI will not affect our main empirical tests of whether RTs convey information and whether subjects use this information.
Under a stochastic choice model, this rule also implies that the probability of choosing in line with one's signal is strictly increasing in ! . Motivated by the evidence for SSMs, this probability can be captured with a standard logit choice function:
where λ is the inverse temperature parameter that determines the noise in subjects' choices, and c is a constant equal to the value of the NPI where a subject is indifferent between choosing with her signal or against it.
C. Choice process predictions from Sequential Sampling Models
In the previous two sections, we outlined the predictions for choices under both the BNE and alternative models of bounded rationality where subjects infer information from choices within a cascade. However, we can generate further predictions using a well-known class of theories from psychology and neuroscience called sequential sampling models (SSMs). These models make quantitative predictions about the choice process, and in particular, how RTs and choice probabilities relate to the evidence favoring one option over the other. We briefly review these models now and describe their predictions in the current setting.
Sequential sampling models originate in cognitive science, where they have been used to study perception, memory, and other similar functions. These models assume that the agent has access to noisy information that reflects the true state of the world. The agent accumulates this information over time until he determines that there is sufficient evidence favoring one alternative over the other(s). Thus SSMs are characterized by the accumulation of stochastic evidence up to predetermined thresholds. Mathematically, when the net evidence accumulation rate ("drift rate") increases, decisions become less stochastic and take less time. Mean RT is maximized when the drift rate is zero; that is, when there is on average equal evidence favoring each alternative (though there are some exceptions; see Ratcliff & McKoon 2008) .
In the realm of economic choice, SSMs have been primarily applied to simple choice settings where the 'evidence' is based on idiosyncratic subjective preference. There are two core empirical findings in these studies, and in the SSM literature more broadly. The first result is that RTs generally provide a measure of the strength of preference. Short RTs indicate easy decisions (in the sense that the utility difference between two alternatives is large) and long RTs indicate difficult decisions (in the sense that the two alternatives yield similar utility). The second result is that, conditional on decision difficulty (i.e. drift rate), error decisions are generally slower than correct decisions (though again there are some exceptions; see Ratcliff & McKoon 2008) .
Our experiment differs from these previous studies in that the subjects' preferences are objective: everyone should prefer to choose the correct state (A vs. B) since that yields an objectively better outcome ($1 vs. $0). Here the 'evidence' is instead based on the previous subjects' choices (the public information) and the current signal (the private information). If SSMs indeed extend to strategic settings, then RTs should reflect the relative evidence favoring one state over the other. Thus a subject's RT may help signal to others that his decision was easy or difficult. Specifically, if a subject takes a long time to decide, it may be that his private information conflicted with the actions that he has observed. Thus, a subject is more likely to discount the action of his predecessor when the predecessor exhibits a longer RT.
III. Results
A. Inferring information from response times
Because our main goal is to test whether subjects can infer information from each other's RTs, we must first assess whether RTs contain any information.
As a first step in assessing whether RTs are informative, we investigate whether subjects' choices and RTs were associated with the congruency between their private signals and others' choices, as captured by our NPI measure. We define a congruent signal as one in which NPI>0 and an incongruent signal as one in which NPI<0. In other words, a private signal is congruent when it matches the majority of public choices. We find that subjects were more likely to choose in line with their signal as the NPI increased (Fig. 1) These results are inconsistent with the prediction of BNE theory that a cascade should be should be triggered as soon as | NPI | > 1. Under BNE, when NPI = -2, subjects should have always chosen against their signal. Instead, they only did so 49% of the time, and as the NPI became more negative, subjects increasingly contradicted their private signal.
Turning to the RT data, we find strong support for the SSM prediction that RTs peak near indifference (Fig. 2) . The highest median RT occurred for an NPI of -3, with -2 being a close second (if we pool across conditions, the highest median RT occurs at -2) 2 . Even for positive values of the NPI where subjects nearly always chose with their signal (98%), RTs still significantly decreased by 65 ms for every unit of NPI (p=0.056, using log(RT) as the dependent variable in a linear regression on NPI). This variation in RT over the positive domain of NPI therefore provides information about the strength of preference 3 even without variation in the choice outcome data. Indeed, when conditioning on positive values of the NPI, we find that there is no significant relationship between NPI and the probability that a subject chooses with his signal (p=0.34).
To investigate this further, we focus on trials where RTs should be most informative about a subject's private signal. The logic behind this analysis is as follows. A subject who chooses an action that is against the herd should only do so when his private signal is incongruent. In such circumstances, the choice outcome reveals the private signal, and RT should not contain any additional information about the private signal. Indeed we find that on 92% of trials in which a subject chose against the herd, his choice matched his private signal. Now consider the more interesting case where the subject chooses in line with the herd. In this case there is more uncertainty about whether the subject received a congruent signal (and thus had a trivial decision) or an incongruent signal (and chose against his private signal). Indeed, we find that on trials where a subject chose in line with the herd, the choice matched the private signal in only 66% of trials, compared to 92% of trials when the subject chose against the herd. Therefore, in this case, RTs can potentially provide information about private beliefs that is not contained in choices.
To test whether RTs do contain this extra information, we restrict our analysis to the trials where subjects chose in line with the herd (i.e., where RTs potentially contain additional information beyond choice). We find that on trials where subjects received a congruent signal, and thus had an easy decision, the average RT was 1.95 seconds. In contrast, when a subject received an incongruent signal and ultimately chose to follow the herd, the average RT was nearly twice as long, 3.79 seconds (p< 10 -10 for the test of difference in means or medians). Thus, in this very basic sense, RTs do seem to carry information about private beliefs beyond the information contained in the choice outcomes.
One potential concern with the above analysis is that the NPI does not capture all publicly available information contained in the sequence of choice outcomes. In other words, two trials can be characterized by the same NPI, but the sequence that generates this NPI can differ. It is therefore important to take into account the sequence of choices before we can conclude that RTs truly carry information that cannot be inferred from choice outcomes. To do so, we can further restrict our analysis to trials where all predecessors chose the same option (either A or B). Among this subset of trials, a sufficient statistic for the information contained in choice outcomes is given by the subject's position in the sequence (or equivalently, the length of the cascade). Thus, for a given position in the sequence, the only dimension on which RTs can differ is the congruency of that subject's private signal.
Because SSMs predict that easier decisions are associated with shorter RTs, we expect that on trials where a subject receives an incongruent signal and chooses with the herd, RTs will decrease with the size of the herd. In contrast, on congruent signal trials where the subject chooses with the herd, there is no conflict between the private signal and the herd, and so we expect the size of the herd to minimally affect the ease of the decision or the RT.
Consistent with both of these conjectures, Figure 3 displays the median RTs on trials where subjects chose with the herd, conditional on every subject choosing the same option up to that point. The figure shows that the difference in median RT between incongruent and congruent signals was significant for all but the largest herd size of 7 (p=0.01, p=0.0009, p=0.03, p=0.08, p=0.02, p=0.56 for 2 through 7 herd size, respectively, based on two-sided t-tests treating each subject as one observation). In other words, given the same history of choice outcomes and conditional on choosing with the herd, RTs are longer when a subject receives an incongruent signal compared to a congruent signal.
Moreover, the data in Figure 3 show that on trials with a congruent signal (i.e. the subject chose with his private signal), RTs were independent of the size of the herd; however, on trials with an incongruent signal (i.e. the subject chose against his private signal), RTs were significantly longer but decreased as the size of the herd increased. A linear regression of log(RT) on size of the herd confirms these results. When regressing log(RT) on herd size for congruent signals, there is no significant effect (p=0.48). However, we do find a significant effect of herd size on log(RT) for incongruent trials (p=10 -7 ), and we also find a significant interaction effect between incongruent trials and herd size (p=0.006), indicating that RTs are more sensitive to herd size in incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. In summary, these analyses demonstrate that RTs provide additional information about subjects' private signals, beyond what is contained in their publicly available choice outcomes. Before we test whether subjects can infer information from these RTs, it is first important to check whether subjects might have strategically manipulated their RTs in the RT condition. This is a critical check because strategic manipulation could alter the interpretation of the relationship between choices, RTs, and NPI.
To test this, we ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the difference in RT distributions between the RT and no-RT conditions. In other words, we formally test whether the two distributions displayed in Figure 2 are statistically different from one another. We found no significant difference between the two RT distributions (D=0.039, p=0.39).
B. The impact of predecessors' response times on behavior
We next test whether subjects detected the extra information contained in RTs, and whether this impacted behavior. Table 1 displays the rate at which subjects chose to follow their private signals, disaggregated by condition and position.
Given that all the theories and the data support the idea that the first two subjects simply choose with their private signal, the subject in the third position is the first subject whose choice is potentially driven by public information, and so the subject in the fourth position is the first point at which we would expect to see any influence of the RT information on choices. Thus in the following regressions we restrict the analyses to subjects in positions 4-8. Using a logistic regression of "choose with private signal" as a function of position, we find a strong significant decrease with position in the no-RT condition (p<0.001) but no such decrease in the RT condition (p=0.55). A second model that included data from both conditions indeed identified a significant interaction between condition and position (p=0.002). These results indicate that in the no-RT condition subjects were increasingly likely to ignore their private information in the face of more public information, while this was not the case in the RT condition.
We next examined situations where a subject's signal conflicted with his predecessor's choice. Splitting the predecessor's RTs into quartiles, we find that in the RT condition, subjects were more likely to choose in line with their private signal when the predecessor had a long RT (third and fourth quartiles) than when the predecessor had a short RT (first and second quartiles) (Fig. 4) . There was no such relationship in the no-RT condition. A simpler median-split analysis reveals a significant difference between short and long RT bins for the RT condition (p=0.0007 two-sample t-test) but no such difference for the no-RT condition (p=0.21 two-sample t-test). This suggests that a subject was able to infer from a long RT that his predecessor might have received an incongruent signal, discouraging him from following the predecessor's choice.
We analyzed this phenomenon more formally with a logistic regression using "choose with private signal" as the dependent variable ( Table 2 ). The key variable is the triple interaction between the predecessor's RT, RT condition, and a dummy for whether the private signal conflicts with the predecessor's move.
The coefficient on this variable provides the effect that RTs have on choosing with the private signal, in situations where the private signal conflicts with the predecessor's move (in the RT condition compared to the no-RT condition). In column (1) we find that this coefficient is significantly positive, indicating that when a subject's private signal conflicts with his predecessor's move, a subject is more likely to choose with his private signal as the predecessor's RT increases.
In column (2) we control for order effects, and find that the main result is robust to the order in which the no-RT condition was run. This confirms the notion that when private signals conflict with a predecessor's choice, subjects discount the information from their predecessor's choices when those choices were slower. We next examined individual-level behavior in situations with > 2.
These are the situations in which a decision maker might wonder whether the previous subject chose in line with their signal or simply followed the herd. We tested whether subjects were more likely to follow their private signal conditional on the correctness of the cascade and the condition (RT vs. no-RT).
We find that for correct cascades, subjects were no more likely to follow their private signals in the RT vs. no-RT conditions (73% vs. 74%, p=0.92 two-sample t-test; paired test is impossible due to missing observations). However, for incorrect ("reverse") cascades, subjects were significantly more likely to follow their private signals in the RT vs. no-RT conditions (56% vs. 41%, p=0.05 twosample t-test) (Fig. 5) .
We can further restrict this analysis to situations where a subject's private signal conflicts with the herd. In these situations, for correct cascades, subjects exhibited a similar propensity to follow their private signals in the RT vs. no-RT conditions (22% vs. 19%, p=0.36 two-sample t-test), while for incorrect cascades, subjects were again significantly more likely to follow their private signals in the RT vs. no-RT conditions (30% vs. 12%, p=0.02 two-sample t-test). Thus in the RT condition, subjects were more likely to go with their private information when the group was incorrect.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we conducted an experiment to test 1) whether RTs contain information about a subject's private information and 2) whether subjects infer private information from endogenously generated RTs. We find broad support in favor of both hypotheses. First, the distribution of RTs and choices in the no-RT conditions was consistent with the predictions from SSMs, where RTs peak at indifference and become shorter as the strength of preference between two alternatives gets larger. This result is important because it was previously unclear whether SSMs, which have so far only been used in economics for simple subjective preference problems, would extend to more complex settings that involve strategic choice. From an applied econometrician's point of view, the result is also interesting because the RT data provides extra information about the subject's private signal that is not contained in the choice data alone, thus allowing for a more precise estimation of beliefs.
Second, we find that subjects in the experiment were able to extract information about a predecessor's private signal from RTs. This is surprising because subjects were not instructed to take this information into account, nor were they given any information about the mapping between RTs and private information. Indeed, the first part of this paper involved trying to understand whether such a mapping exists. Therefore, while it is possible that the salient nature of the RT information in the RT treatment may have "primed" subjects towards incorporating this information into their decisions, it is difficult to argue that subjects were primed to understand and make use of the mapping between RTs and private information.
One interesting aspect of our RT results is that subjects in our experiment had a fixed decision time window of 10 seconds, meaning that they could not proceed through the experiment any faster by choosing more quickly.
Nevertheless, we observed the standard relationship between strength of preference and RT. This questions some of the literature assuming that SSM processes are driven by speed-accuracy tradeoffs. In this case subjects could not increase their reward rate by moving through the experiment more quickly, thus the optimal strategy would have been to use the full 10 seconds to decide. Of course, if one thinks more broadly about rewards obtained outside of the experimental context, one can rationalize such behavior by assuming that the subjects find it more rewarding to get the decisions over with quickly, in order to reduce mental effort (Kool and Botvinick 2014) .
As a first pass at testing whether subjects use RTs in their decisions, we designed the experiment in what we believe to be the simplest setting possible.
In particular, RTs were not technically part of the action space, in the sense that neither subject i's RT nor the actions of subsequent agents affect his payoff. In this setting there is no incentive for a subject to strategically transmit his choice process data. One could certainly imagine variants on this setting where a subject's payoff is a function of the accuracy of all agents in the group. In this case, subjects would have an incentive to strategically choose their action and RT. Whether or not people exhibit such behavior is an interesting direction for future research.
It is worth mentioning how our results relate to other work on RTs in economics. In particular, Eliaz and Rubinstein (2014) In future work it will be important to study the distinguishing features of these two types of decision environments.
Finally, the decisions in our experiment were made relatively quickly, compared to what we would expect in a high-stakes, single-shot decision. There is a potential worry that subjects might therefore be relying on simple heuristics that would not apply in "real world" situations. However, the use of simple heuristics would only hinder our (and the subjects') ability to infer information from the RTs since it would make responses more automatic and less sensitive to the weight of information. In high-stakes decisions, we would only expect RTs to be more informative. In a SSM framework we would expect increased stakes to cause agents to widen their decision barriers, increasing the emphasis on accuracy at the cost of speed. This in turn would generate a larger gap between average RTs for easy vs. difficult problems. It is also important to recognize that many economically relevant decisions in our personal and professional lives are made quite quickly (e.g. choosing between a high-quality high-price vs. lowquality low-price item at the grocery store); these SSM processes may therefore underlie a substantial portion of economic transactions. While our paper provides evidence that SSMs extend to strategic environments, more research is needed to explore the scope of these models in more general environments of the economy. Table 2 . Dependent variable is equal to 1 if subject chose with his signal, and 0 otherwise. "position" is the subject's position in the round (1-8), "NPI" is net public information as defined in the main text, "rt_cond" is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the subject was in the RT condition, "prevRT" is the predecessor's RT (in seconds), "nosigmatch" takes on the value 1 if the subject's private signal does not match his predecessor's move. "NORT_first" is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the subject was in a session where the no-RT condition was run first. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level and tstatistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Instructions
Thank you for participating in today's study.
Please carefully read the material on the following pages to understand:
• The rules
• The decisions you will be making today
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment, please ask them before the experiment or during the designated breaks.
The rules
• Please check now to ensure that your mobile phone is on silent mode and put away in your bag or turned off.
The study
Today you will be making a series of choices, and your final payment will depend on your choices and chance. There are two parts to the study. You will receive instructions for each of these parts as we move through the study.
Payment
Your payment will consist of two amounts:
• A show-up fee of $5
• Your earnings from the series of choices you make.
Part 1
This part of the study consists of 15 games that you will play with 7 other participants that are seated in this room. Each game will be played with a different group of participants. Your goal in each game is to predict which of two possible digital boxes was selected by the computer at the beginning of each game. The two possible boxes are labeled "A" and "B". Box A contains two "A" balls and one "B" ball, while Box B contains one "A" ball and two "B" balls. The boxes are represented below:
At the beginning of each game, the computer will randomly select one of the two digital boxes with an equal chance. There is a 50% chance it will select Box A, and a 50% chance it will select Box B. Once the box is selected, the game will begin. Although the identity of the box will not be revealed to you until the end of each game, you will be given some information that might be useful in predicting which box the computer selected.
Each of you will take turns predicting which box has been selected. At the beginning of your turn, you will see two pieces of information:
(1) A private signal that contains information about the selected box.
Specifically, the computer will randomly draw one of the balls from the box and you will be told whether it is an "A" ball or a "B" ball. Only the current decision maker gets to see this private signal. It is important to realize that on each turn the computer will re-draw a new ball from the selected box. This means that you might see the same ball or a different ball than the other participants before you, even though the ball came from the same box.
(2) The predictions from the previous decision makers in the current game
The order of turns will be randomly determined by the computer, and will be different in each game. For example, in the first game you may go 2 nd while in the second game you may go 8 th . Once you receive your signal, you will be asked to predict from which box the ball was drawn. This is the only decision you make in each game and you will have ten seconds to make it. In the event you run out of time, the computer will randomly make a decision for you. Note that the computer will always wait the full ten seconds before moving on to the next round, regardless of when you make your decision.
At the end of every participant's turn you will see their prediction as well as any other participants' earlier predictions. Again, it is important to note that you will observe the participants' predictions, but not their private signals. For example, suppose that the first participant has made his decision and has predicted Box B.
In this case, every participant in the group would see the following screen:
Once the last participant has received their private signal and entered their prediction, the true box will be revealed to the group. Each participant that correctly predicted the box will win $1 and the rest will earn nothing.
Therefore, if you successfully predict the box in all 15 games, you will earn $15 for this part of the study. If you fail to correctly predict the box in all 15 games, you will earn nothing for this part of the study.
Before the experiment begins we will have two practice games. The practice games are only for you to become familiar with the user interface of the study and you will not earn any money in these games. Also, during the practice games you will have more time to make your decisions (15 seconds).
A.2. Instructions for RT Condition, First Half Instructions
The rules
The study
Payment
Part 1
This part of the study consists of 15 games that you will play with 7 other participants that are seated in this room. Each game will be played with a different group of participants. Your goal in each game is to predict which of two possible digital boxes was selected by the computer at the beginning of each game. The two possible boxes are labeled "A" and "B". Box A contains two "A" balls and one "B" ball, while Box B contains one "A" ball and two "B" balls. The boxes are pictured below:
Each of you will take turns predicting which box has been selected. At the beginning of your turn, you will see three pieces of information:
(2) The predictions from the previous participants in the current game.
(3) The amount of time that it took previous participants to make their decisions.
This "response time" (RT) is the number of seconds between when the participant's private signal is revealed and the time when he/she enters his/her prediction.
At the end of every participant's turn you will see their prediction and RT as well as any other participants' earlier predictions and RTs. Again, it is important to note that you will observe the participants' predictions and RTs, but not their private signals. For example, suppose that the first participant has made his decision and has predicted Box B in 3.45 seconds. In this case, every participant in the group would see the following screen:
A.3. Instructions for No-RT Condition, Second Half Instructions Part 2
The second part of the study is identical to the first part, except that you will no longer see information about the time it took other participants to make their predictions. Specifically, the column of response times that you saw in Part 1 will no longer be visible to you. An example screenshot with the response time removed is shown below. Besides this change, everything else about the game is the same as it was in the first part of the experiment. Note that the computer will still always wait the full ten seconds before moving on to the next round, regardless of when you make your decision.
A.4. Instructions for RT Condition, Second Half Instructions Part 2
The second part of the study is identical to the first part, except that you will be given extra information about the amount of time it took previous participants to make their decisions. This "response time" (RT) is the number of seconds between when the participant's private signal is revealed and the time when he/she enters his/her prediction. An example screenshot with RT information is shown below. Besides this extra information that you will receive, everything else about the game is the same as it was in the first part of the experiment. Note that the computer will still always wait the full ten seconds before moving on to the next round, regardless of when you make your decision.
